Abstract-Auction-based models and protocols introduce money and pricing as the technique for coordination between users and producers of resources in grids. In this paper, we propose a multi-attribute reverse auction protocol to allocate grid resource. In order to enhance the information efficiency we develop a novel interactive approach supporting both user agents and producer agents. In this approach, an iterative algorithm used to estimate the resource user's preference utility function can facilitate producer agents to update their bids with incomplete information. Numerical simulating experiments show that our approach can satisfy the resource user's quality demand on multiple attributes, and achieve high efficiency in user utility. The results also provide an idea to analyze the twoside private information problem in gird resource allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Grid computing has not become an important field of research in computer science, but also a new paradigm for solving computationally large problems by providing access to large scale shared computing resources. The grid enables resource share and dynamically allocate the computational environments from different domains. The grid resources' features, e.g., highly dynamic, uncontrollable and distributed, increase the difficulties of grid resources allocation. All these characteristics show that grid system needs a dynamic and high-efficiency resources management. Several economic-based resource allocation mechanisms have been proposed. In general, they are better than the classical resource allocation schemes in that they are decentralized in structure and they use incentives for resource users to contribute resources.
There exists two basic economic models in the resource management fields namely commodities markets and auctions [1] . In the commodities market model, a publicly agreed price is proposed for each resource. By contrast, in the auction model, the auction participants would trade-off at a price that is unknown before the auction ends. Also, the resource users and resource providers act dependently and they can negotiate on the trading price. Auction models have advantage over commodities market models for grid resource allocation because they require little global information, have decentralized structure and are easy to implement. Most previous work considers only one type of auctions and compares it with other economic and conventional models. In [2] , three types of auction allocation protocols are provided: First Price Auction, Vickrey Auction, and Double Auction. From users' and grid resources' perspective, they wanted to find the most suitable resource allocation mechanisms for the grid environment. The double auction models have been received more attention. Three most popular double auctions are: Preston-McAfee Double Auction Protocol (PMDA), Threshold Price Double Auction Protocol (TPDA), and Continuous Double Auction Protocol (CDA). Huang et al. [3] investigated that a periodic double auction mechanism with uniform price suited for resource allocation in Grid. In their work, the double auction took place in rounds and all exchanges were performed with the same price. Zakian et al. [4] also used a continuous double auction method for grid resource allocation. They provided market-like techniques to provide an incentive for resource providers, and motivated the resource users to trade-off between deadline, budget, and the required level of quality of service. In [5] [6] , the computational auction mechanism for allocating and scheduling computer resources such as processors or storage space that had multiple quality attributes was proposed. The mechanism was evaluated according to its economic and computational performance. Mirzayi et al. modified the bidding stage using Signcryption model [7] . The results showed that the new model had a good behavior in grid environment and increased security and fairness with this method. Some researchers have paid attention to the multiple auctions. Anthony et al. [8] developed a heuristic decision-making framework through which an autonomous agent could exploit to tackle the problem of bidding across multiple auctions with varying start and end times. Gorbanzadeh et al. proposed two types of hybrid genetic algorithms to improve the efficiency of genetic algorithm for solving the winner determination problem. Results declared that the proposed algorithms had good efficiency and led to better answers [9] .
In fact, the grid resources have multiple quality attributes in the auction mechanisms. Che [10] originally presented a thorough analysis of the design of multiattribute auctions. He designed an optimal scoring rule based on the assumption that the buyer knew the probability distribution of the supplier's cost parameter. Branco [11] derived an optimal auction mechanism when the suppliers' costs were correlated based on Che's independent cost model. Another issue in developing an appropriate scoring function lies in elicitation of preferred information for multiple attributes. Teich et al. [12] showed some concept about internet-based implementations and used MAUT technique for bid evaluation in single-sourcing, multi-attribute reverse auctions. The similar techniques also include analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and price out technique [13] . Leskela et al. [14] developed a quantity support mechanism (QSM) by the pricing out approach, which could provide not only suggested price for the bidders, but also quantified decision support. These methods are similar to the value function case. Because all the attributes are converted into monetary values, the multiattribute problem can become the resulting singleattribute problem.
Different from the original literature, we describe a novel reverse auction-based protocol to model the grid resources allocation problem consisting of multi-attribute resources. In fact, there are many resources types including computer system, network subsystem, file system, database system and so on. Each resource type is associated with one or more attributes with specific values. For example, there are some attributes of a computer system, i.e., CPU architecture, total and available memory, maximum and current degree of multiprogramming, and so on. Therefore, the price-only negotiations are not suitable. Other attributes such as resource speed and memory may influence both resource users and providers' decisions. Our concern in this paper is to build a bridge between the grid resource allocation and multi-criteria spheres. We introduce an interactive approach to provide aid both to the resource users and providers for multi-attribute auction. An iterative algorithm is presented to facilitate the estimated preference utility function for resource provider agents to update their bids to be competitive in the next round. Our approach will enhance information efficiency by not only reducing the transmission costs of true information but also decreasing the transmission of false information. Finally, the simulating experiments show that the reverse auction-based protocol and its related iterative algorithm have good behavior in grid environment. They have better performance on user utility value level and market information efficiency.
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 gives the reverse auction-based grid allocation protocol and model. In section 3, we present the bidding strategies for resource provider agents (RPAs). The iterative algorithm is presented to help the RPAs efficiently discover the user's true utility preference. The simulating experiment results are presented in section 4. In section 5 we draw conclusions and present future research directions.
II. REVERSE AUCTION-BASED GRID ALLOCATION: MODEL AND PROTOCOL

A. Multi-attribute Reverse Auction Model
The entities in our grid environment are resource users and resource providers. Resource users have one or more independent computational-intensive jobs for execution and are willing to pay for it. Also resource providers have computational resources and are willing to rent them for profit. We use the resource user agent (RUA) that works on behalf of the users and the resource provider agent (RPA) that works on behalf of resource providers. The user agents and provider agents are two intelligent entities having their own specific objectives. They interact with each other in the form of a multiattribute reverse auction protocol for obtaining their objectives.
We assume that there are n rounds with the expired time 0 T > . Different from the current literature, we suppose that in each round there is more than one RPA arriving, i.e., there are x resource provider agents, k attributes, and a single resource user agent in each round. We represent the resource provider agent i in round t as t i s , where
I . e . , in round t, t i s arrives and places one multiattribute bid, denoted by 1 2 ( , , )
, where t ij a stands for the level of the jth ( j k ∈ ) attribute of the ith resource provider agent in round t. In this paper, we consider a dynamic setting for grid resource allocation. I.e., given the multi-attribute bid vector t i b , the resource user agent must decide whether to accept the multiattribute bid, before entering the next round. I.e., the resource user agent computes an output consisting of the quantity and price for winner(s) in current round. The game ends when the last seller announces his multiattribute bid during the time of [0, ] T . In our system shown in Fig.1 , the resource user agent acts as an auctioneer. He notifies all available resources provider agents that the resource needs computing service, then each resources provider agent bids according to his own private price. Finally, the resource user agent decides who win the bid according to the auction rules.
B. Multi-attribute Reverse Auction Protocol
In this paper, we consider the problem of reverse auction allocation problem with available grid resources of multiple attributes. The multi-attribute reverse auction (MRA) protocol is provided as follows.
MRA Step 2: In round t , there is more than one RPA coming and presenting their bids together with other attributes.
Step 3: The RUA decides whether to accept these bids. If someone RPA improves the preferred utility value by ∆, then notice him that he is the temporary winner. Place the accepted bid in set SP and go to Step 4. Otherwise, place the refused bid in set NSP and go to Step 6. Step 4: RPAs estimate the resource user's utility function.
Step 4.1: For RPAs the objective function is to find the maximum ε satisfying the constraints, where ε is the minimum difference between the utility function of the preferred bid and the other bids.
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Step 4.2: Update the preference constraint set. Step 6: Set 1 t t = + . Go to Step 2. If t n = , go to Step 7.
Step 7: Stop. The winning RPAs, whose bids are in SP .
If there is more than one winning RPAs, the RUA selects by additional information, e.g., cooperation and reputation. In this iterative algorithm, the RUA uses the resource user's true preference utility function to choose most preferred bid in current round according to Step 2. This information may be less powerful for RUA to estimate the true function, but large numbers of rounds could improve efficiency of our approach. In Step 3, if there is more than one winner in round t , the RUA could select one of them by other additional information.
Step 5 presents the estimated preference value in round t denoted by * (1 ) t u u = +Δ , where * u is the estimated preference value of the best bid of the current round. As larger value of * u is preferred, we multiply * u with 1+ Δ to obtain improved bids from the RPAs. In this step, RPAs can utilize this estimated contour to update their bids and other attributes.
IV. SIMULATING EXPERIMENTS
In this section, the simulating experiments are given to describe two attributes about speed and memory, which are important for the resource user to make decision. The simulating experiments facilitate the evaluation of reverse auction resource allocation protocol in terms of resource user's utility level and auction efficiency. In our simulation, a resource user submits requests or jobs to the RUA, which in turn initiates an auction for each request or job. The iterative algorithm is utilized to help the RPAs discover the true utility function. RPAs are the bidders and they bid for executing jobs. Thus, we simulate that there are three RPAs in each round, who present bids together with two attributes. RPAs update their bids with the given information in round 4. We also can not find the feasible solution when 2 β = . Thus, we set V. CONCLUSIONS This paper introduces the multi-attribute reverse auction protocol into the grid resource allocation problem, which extends some results in earlier research. For this protocol, we hope to build a bridge between the grid resource allocation and multi-criteria spheres. We develop an interactive approach to estimate the parameter values of the underlying preference value function of the resource user using his/her past preferences. This decision supporting tool has important potential benefits for all parties participating in auctions, i.e., resource users and resource providers. One of the future directions is to consider more information about input sequence of resource provider agents' bids. The other one is to discuss the better solution for winner determination problem to improve the allocation result and performance, and apply this mechanism to a real grid system.
